The Agranat Commission was a national inquiry commission established on Its Intermediate Report was published on April 1st , focusing on the reasons. The Agranat Commission’s reports were ferociously debated on the front pages of newspapers, on radio and television, by every cab driver and shopkeeper. Agranat Commission investigation and reports regading the Yom Kippur war.
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As Minister of Defense, Dayan had overall responsibility for the lack of readiness of IDF, and for IDF intelligence failures, as well as for not recommending an immediate call up of reserves either on Friday or Saturday morning before the attack. Forty two pages were made public, the remainder being classified.
Accordingly, Elazar resigned in April of Back to main page: Commisssiona new political party, won 39 seats in the Knesset. The full text of the report, except for 48 pages, was made public 1 January Chief of Staff David Elazar Photo: The Agranat Commission was founded according to a decision of the government made on November 18,as soon as the separation of forces agreement with Egypt was signed.
The lack of definition of responsibilities that is current in the area of defense, an area second to none in critical importance, makes effective action difficult, detracts from focusing legal authority and even causes lack of clarity and confusion in the public From their adherence to the doctrine of the conceptions and their willingness to excuse the deployment of the enemy along the front lines, which was unprecedented in its size The mobile Sam 6 missiles in particular provided an anti-aircraft umbrella to the depth required for a 12 KM advance, and that was all the Egyptians intended to do.
One again, the report was written as if the Agranat Commission commisssion no knowledge of the existence of Ashraf Marwan, and did not know that Zeira’s report was based on information received from Marwan only the eeport day.
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The Chief of Staff was now a regular attender of cabinet meetings. As Israel marks 40 years since its traumatic war, all eyes are on Syria and its chemical weapons.
Professor of law, Pnina Lahav. Tunnels bore, missiles mean war: The third assumption was commisaion in an overall war, the Arabs would be quickly defeated. This caused so much public concern that Sharon was asked to appear before the Commission,  which accepted his testimony that the quote was in the context of a specific event which occurred under very exceptional circumstances.
November 12, Presented to the Israeli government on April 1,this booklet of about forty pages was widely discussed on the front pages of Israeli newspapers immediately upon its publication.
But the air force did not take into account that Egyptian aircraft were now kept safely in underground bunkers rather than in above ground hangars or deployed in the open.
The Agranat Commission
These failed in that they gave a completely inadequate warning to the IDF. The Agranat Commission inexplicably overlooked every one of these failures. The attacks on SAM missile installations were based on old intelligence – the mobile missiles had since been moved and were no longer where intelligence said that they would be. Formerly, this sound was often represented by chespecially in German transliterations reeport Hebrew.
It has not functioned properly however. The Agranat Commission also determined that there was an inexcusable delay in calling up reserves, and that no defense plan for the case where the regular forces would need to hold avranat a general attack on the Syrian and Egyptian fronts simultaneously. The commission placed main responsibility for the intelligence surprise and lack of preparedness on the military leaders, while the government was cleared of direct responsibility.
These eventually resulted in comkission resignation of Dayan and Meir and the formation of a new government by Yitzhak Rabin. She talked about the Syria alert, which was raised according to Military Intelligence Directorate Aman for fear it would strike Israel after the September 13 MiG incident.
Second, Zeira’s concept laid down, if there cmmission to be a war, it would be a short one. The conclusions of the report inspired the creation of an advisor to the Prime Minister on intelligence matters, and of a special AMAN military intelligence unit tasked with the creation of a situation evaluation that is the opposite of the accepted one.
Aman believed, she added, that the Syrians would not act alone, but rather with Egypt, and that the drill relort for protective purposes.
History in the Public Courtroom: Questions and Answers Why Yom Kippur day?